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that enhance the value of the good. More users of a fuel-cell vehicle, for example, encourages entry into the market of charge stations, which leads to the increased value of such vehicles. On the other hand, much of bandwagon consumption in the fashion, toy and electronic industries can be explained through psychological externalities where consumers' tastes for a particular good are directly influenced by the size of its consumption. When all types of externalities are accounted for, it would be no exaggeration to say that a substantial fraction of consumption goods have network properties.
Despite their importance, network goods have received relatively little attention in economic theory. 1 Analysis of network goods in the literature has mostly been focused on the resolution of the coordination problem arising from the multiplicity of equilibria. When every consumer expects others to adopt the good, its expected value is high enough to render adoption a rational decision (at least for some price). On the other hand, when every consumer expects no other consumers to adopt, then its low expected value makes no adoption rational. Expectation is self-fulfilling in both cases, leading to multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. A subsidy scheme as proposed by Dybvig and Spatt (1983) is one way to eliminate the problem by promising to compensate the adopters when the number of adoptions is below some threshold. The existence of Pareto-ranked equilibria is also the main focus of the analysis of intertemporal patterns of adoption of a network good. 2 In contrast, the problem of revenue maximization by a monopolist has been analyzed only partially either through the analysis of subsidy schemes under the implicit assumption that higher participation implies higher revenue, or through the analysis of introductory prices, a common practice of setting a low price for early adopters and a higher, regular price for others. 3 In contrast, our objective in this paper is to directly explore the revenue maximization problem in the incomplete information environment.
In the present context, an allocation is the list of all buyers' adoption/nonadoption decisions. Each buyer i's valuation function v i depends on an allocation, and also is an increasing function of his private signal distributed over the unit interval. A price-posting scheme is described as follows: The seller first posts a price of every possible allocation for each buyer. The buyers then report their private signals to the seller. An allocation is determined by the reports through an allocation rule, and offered to the buyers at the originally posted price. Finally, each buyer who is supposed to adopt in the proposed allocation chooses whether to accept the offer or not. 4 We analyze a revenue maximizing price posting scheme that is strategy-proof and ex post individually rational. Our analysis focuses on the "regularity" property defined as follows: We say that for buyer i, price p of an allocation a is more affordable than price p of allocation a if for some signal s i , i's valuation of a is above p but his valuation of a is below p . In other words, buyer i is willing to accept a at p whenever he is willing to accept a at p . A price-posting scheme is regular if (1) whenever allocation a is larger than allocation a (i.e., a has more adopters than a ), the price of a is more affordable than the price of a for every buyer, and (2) the allocation rule chooses the largest allocation as permitted by individual rationality. When the buyers' private signals are independently distributed, we find that the optimal scheme is regular when there are only two buyers. For a general number of ex ante symmetric buyers, we demonstrate the optimality of a regular scheme among the class of symmetric schemes when the externalities are sufficiently strong. We also show that a regular scheme is coalitionally strategy-proof in the sense that no group deviations are profitable, and that there exists a regular scheme that is optimal among the class of symmetric coalitionally strategy-proof schemes. The latter findings indicate the robustness of the optimality of a regular price-posting scheme against buyer collusion. 5 The idea of price-posting schemes is most closely related to the concept of an inducement scheme proposed by Park (2004) . An inducement scheme, which is itself a generalization of the subsidy schemes discussed above to the incomplete information environment, is a sales mechanism in which the transfer between the seller and buyers depends on the final allocation. We may think of an inducement scheme as first posting a price of each allocation, and then letting the buyers simultaneously decide whether to adopt or not. Hence, an inducement scheme is a subclass of price-posting schemes in which the buyers' adoption decisions are made independently of one another. In contrast, a price-posting scheme coordinates their decisions through the reported signal profile.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces a price posting scheme. Ex post implementable schemes are characterized in Section 3. We study the problem with two buyers in Section 4, and optimal symmetric schemes with a general number of ex ante symmetric buyers in Sections 5 and 6. Section 5 analyzes the case of strong externalities, and Section 6 analyzes coalitionally strategy-proof schemes. We conclude in Section 7. All the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Model
There are I potential buyers of a network good indexed by i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}. Buyer i's decision is either to buy the good (a i = 1), or not (a i = 0). An allocation (or a network ) is a profile of adoption decisions a = (a i ) i∈I , and an element of the set A = {0, 1} I . Let A i be the set of allocations in which buyer i buys the good: A i = {a ∈ A : a i = 1}. The value of the good to buyer i, denoted v i (a, s i ), depends on the allocation a as well as his own private signal s i . The signal profile s = (s i ) i∈I has a strictly positive joint density g over S = i∈I S i , where S i is the unit interval [0, 1] ⊂ R + .
A social choice function determines the allocation of the good and monetary transfer from each buyer as a function of the private signal profile. Formally, a social choice function is a pair (f, τ ) of an allocation rule f : S → A and a transfer rule τ = (τ 1 , . . . , τ I ) : S → R I : f (s) ∈ A is the allocation under the signal profile s ∈ S, and τ i (s) ∈ R is the monetary transfer from buyer i under s. A social choice
and ex post individually rational if
A social choice function (f, τ ) is ex post implementable if it is both strategy-proof and ex post individually rational. Given the concern for the multiplicity of equilibria in the network good problems, strategy-proofness is a particularly suitable requirement compared with Bayesian incentive compatibility, which does not address the multiplicity issue. 6 Ex post individual rationality also adequately handles the possibility of withdrawal by a buyer after they update the value of the good upon learning the seller's recommendation. 7 The social choice function (f, τ ) is simple if for any s, s ∈ S, f (s) = f (s ) implies τ (s) = τ (s ). Under a simple social choice function, hence, the transfer depends on the signal profile only through the allocation. When (f, τ ) is simple, we express it as (f, t), where t : A → R I is a function of the allocation a. A price posting scheme is a mechanism described as follows: For every buyer i and every allocation a ∈ A, the seller first posts price t i (a) charged to buyer i when allocation a is realized. Facing the price schedule, the buyers report their private signals to the seller. The seller then determines and announces the allocation f (s) ∈ A as a function of the report profile s. Finally, every buyer i responds by either accepting or rejecting the proposed allocation. When any buyer rejects, no transaction takes place and every buyer receives the reservation utility of zero. Formally, a price posting scheme can be described by (S, {0, 1} I , f, t), where S is the set of message profiles, {0, 1} is the set of each buyer's decisions to accept (d i = 1) or reject (d i = 0) the proposed allocation, t = (t i (a)) a∈A, i∈I is the posted price schedule, and f = (f i ) i∈I : S → A is the allocation rule. A strategy for buyer i in the price-posting mechanism is a pair (ρ i , σ i ), where ρ i : S i → S i determines the reported signal given his true signal s i , and σ i : S i ×A → {0, 1} determines whether to accept or reject the proposed allocation as a function of the proposal a and the own signal s i . The participation strategy (ρ * i , σ * i ) of buyer i is honest and obedient if ρ * i (s i ) = s i and σ * i (s i , a) = a i for every s i ∈ S i and a ∈ A. Note in particular that buyer i cannot adopt if the proposed allocation f (s) / ∈ A i .
The profile of the honest and obedient strategies (ρ * , σ * ) is an ex post equilibrium if
for every i, s i , and s −i .
6 Park (2004) presents an analysis of Bayesian implementable sales mechanisms for a network good. 7 That is, when buyer i with signal si has reported si and is recommended to adopt for the payment of xi, his updated utility equals
Ex post IR guarantees that the above is non-negative whereas interim IR condition
The first term in the parentheses on the right-hand side corresponds to i's payoff when he makes a false report and then accepts the proposed allocation, and the second term to his payoff when he rejects the proposal. The following result is immediate. This proposition allows us to identify a simple ex post implementable social choice function with a price posting scheme that has honesty and obedience as an ex post equilibrium. In what follows, hence, we call such a social choice function (f, t) an ex post implementable price posting scheme.
Proposition 1 Let
As seen, a price-posting scheme determines the price of the good only as a function of the publicly observable final allocation. As such, it leaves little room for the seller to deviate from his announced mechanism compared with more general mechanisms in which the transfer may vary with the reports even when the allocation is the same. 8 Let the seller's expected revenue per buyer under a price posting scheme (f, t) be defined by
An ex post implementable price posting scheme (f, t) is optimal if it maximizes the seller's expected revenue:
is simple and ex post implementable}.
Characterization of Ex Post Implementability
In this section, we present a basic characterization of ex post implementability that will later be used in the analysis of optimal schemes. We make the following assumptions on the valuation function
Assumption 1 For any i ∈ I and a ∈ A, 8 Suppose that buyer i's payment is higher when some other buyer j reports sj than when he reports s j . Since j's report is privately solicited by the seller and unknown to i, the seller may pretend to i that j has reported sj when in fact he reported s j in order to demand the higher payment. A similar problem arises in a sealed-bid second-price auction.
That is, the value of the good equals zero (1) to a buyer at the lowest margin, and (2) to a non-adopter. Moreover, (3) the value is strictly increasing with the private signal, and (4) when the two allocations are not equivalent to any buyer, the rate of increase in his value is strictly higher for one of them. We introduce some notation as follows. First, let
be the set of allocations among which buyer i is indifferent. For example, when the level of externalities depends only on the size of an allocation defined by |a| =
be the set of possible allocations that buyer i can achieve by changing his report when the signal profile of other buyers is fixed at s −i . Further, for any allocation a ∈ A and profile
be the (closure of the) set of i's signals that would lead to allocation a when others' signal profile is fixed at s −i , and for any allocation a ∈ A,
be the (closure of the) set of signal profiles that induce allocation a. Now suppose that (f, t) is a price-posting scheme. Given any allocation a ∈ A i , define y a i ∈ [0, 1] to be the marginal signal at which buyer i is indifferent between accepting allocation a at price t i (a), and not accepting: 
Again, such a signal y ab i is unique if it exists. 
(a n , ·), and 
4.
Figure 1: Ex post implementable allocation rule and the relative ordering between them is indeterminate. It is also clear from the figure that We assume positive network externalities as follows.
Assumption 2 For each a ∈
The following theorem characterizes the optimal schemes in a general environment with two buyers. 
(B1) 0 < y 10 1 < y 11 1 < y 11,10 1
These configurations are depicted in Figures 2, 3 and 4. As seen, an optimal scheme permits various allocation rules. Which one of these is optimal depends on the specific distribution of signal profiles. 
Independent Signals
A more precise characterization of an optimal scheme becomes possible when we make some additional assumptions on the valuation functions and the signal distribution. Assume specifically that the signals s 1 and s 2 are independent. Let G i be the cumulative distribution function of s i , and for i ∈ I, a ∈ A and s i ∈ S i , define
to be the seller's expected revenue from buyer i when he offers allocation a for price v i (a, s i ). We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 3 1. v i (a, ·)
is strictly log-concave for each a ∈ A i . 9 2.
v 1 (10,·) and
3.
The first two conditions hold, for example, when v i (a, s i ) = γ(a) h(s i ) for some functions γ : A → R + and h : [0, 1] → R + such that h is strictly log-concave. The increasing hazard rate condition in the third line is known to hold for most distributions. As summarized by the following lemma and depicted in Figure 5 , the above assumption implies that the graph of r 1 (a, ·) has a single peak when a = 11 or 10 and that the peak of r 1 (11, ·) is located to the left of that of r 1 (10, ·). 
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Then

For each a ∈
Under a regular scheme, hence, the price of a larger network a = 11 is more affordable than that of a smaller network a = 10 or 01, and the network size is maximized subject to the individual rationality constraints. The second property can also be interpreted as saying that the good is allocated to a single buyer only when the other buyer's signal is too low for joint adoption. Configuration (A0) in Figure 1 corresponds to a regular scheme. If a regular scheme is optimal, then (y 10 1 , y 01 2 ) = (z 10 1 ,z 01 2 ) and
) is an optimal ex post implementable price posting scheme against two buyers under Assumptions 2 and 3, then it is regular.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When y 11 1 < y 10 1 and y 11 2 < y 01 2 , it is impossible to replicate the allocation rule f of a regular scheme by any scheme in which the buyers' decisions are based only on their own signals or on the decisions of other buyers: In any such scheme, at least one buyer's decision (e.g, the first-mover's decision) must be independent of other buyers' signals.
Example:
Suppose that s i has the uniform distribution G i (s i ) = s i , and that the buyers' valuation functions are given by
where 0 < γ < δ. Given that the optimal scheme is regular, the marginal value for the single adoption 10 or 01 equals y 10 1 = y 01 2 = 1 2 . By (3) and symmetry, the marginal value y 11 1 = y 11 2 for the joint adoption 11 solves
Solving this, we get 10
We can confirm that y 11 1 = y 11 2 < 1 2 = y 10 1 = y 01 2 if and only if γ < δ. Consider now the price of each allocation associated with these marginal values. They are given by
From these, we can check that the price of the size 2 network 11 is higher than that of the size 1 network if and only if
In other words, when the network externalities are strong, the actual price of the larger network is higher than that of the smaller network, and vice versa.
Optimal Symmetric Schemes
With more than two buyers, the problem of identifying all the ex post implementable schemes becomes intractable. In this section, we focus on an optimal symmetric scheme when the buyers are ex ante symmetric. We show that the optimal scheme is regular when the network externalities are strong, or when a stronger notion of incentive compatibility is imposed.
Suppose that the signals s 1 , . . . , s I are independent and identically distributed, and denote by g the density of s i and by G the corresponding cumulative distribution. The valuation functions are symmetric in the sense that
The symmetry condition implies that the network externalities depend only on the size of the allocation a ∈ A, defined by |a| = j∈I a j . For this reason, we denote by v n : [0, 1] → R + the valuation function of any single buyer when he adopts an allocation of size n ∈ N ≡ {1, . . . , I}. 11 We say that a price posting scheme (f, t) is symmetric if for any i = j,
, and
That is, when (f, t) is symmetric, swapping the private signals of any pair of buyers results in the swapping of their allocations but does not affect those of any other buyers. 12 When the scheme (f, t) is symmetric, the transfer depends on the allocation only through its size. That is, t i (a) = t j (a ) for any i, j ∈ I and any a ∈ A i , a ∈ A j such that |a| = |a |. Hence, we let t n denote the transfer required of any single buyer when he is one of n adopters of the good. The following assumption is a symmetric generalization of that in the previous section.
g(·)
1−G(·) is strictly increasing.
is weakly decreasing if m < n. 11 Although the set of sizes of positive networks equals the set I = {1, . . . , I} of buyers, we use different notation N to avoid confusion. 12 In the social choice literature, this property is often called anonymity.
Recall from (1) that for any a, a ∈ A i , y a i denotes the signal at which buyer i is indifferent between allocation a priced at t i (a) and no-adoption, and y a,a i denotes the signal at which he is indifferent between a and a . For any m, n ∈ I, m = n, and a, a ∈ A i such that |a| = m and |a | = n, we let y m = y a i , and y mn = y a,a i
. In the present context, y n is defined by
and y n = 0 if t n < 0, and y n = 1 if t n > v n (1) . Likewise, for m < n, y mn = y nm is defined by
and y mn = 0 if t n − t m < 0, and Again, a regular scheme (1) sets a more affordable price for a larger network, and (2) maximizes the network size subject to individual rationality. The second property is implied if for any k ∈ N , |f (s)| = k if and only if |{i ∈ I :
It is also not difficult to see from Proposition 2 that a regular scheme is strategy-proof. 13 As in the case with two buyers, we consider the seller's expected revenue from a single buyer i. Specifically, take any set K ⊂ N and write K = {k 1 , . . . , k m } 13 Proposition 4 below proves that it satisfies a stronger condition of coalitional strategy-proofness.
Let also the marginal signals y = (y 1 , . . . , y I ) ∈ [0, 1] I be given. Suppose now that the seller simultaneously offers buyer i an allocation of size k 1 for price v k 1 (y k 1 ), an allocation of size k 2 for price v k 2 (y k 2 ), and so on. Letting y K = (y k ) k∈K , we will denote by r K (y K ) the seller's expected revenue from these offers to buyer i. 14 When K = {k}, we denote r K (y K ) = r k (y k ), and when K = {k, }, we denote r K (y K ) = r k (y k , y ). Under Assumption 4, we have: Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Then the following hold.
For m < n,
2. For each n ∈ I, r n is strictly log-concave with the (unique) maximizerz n which satisfies
The last observation above says that for the seller, offering two allocations is dominated by offering just one of them when y mn is not so large. 15 Let the marginal signals y = (y 1 , . . . , y I ) and set
The interpretation of L K (y) is as follows. L K (y) is the set of signal profiles of buyers other than i such that when s −i ∈ L K (y), an ex post IR price-posting scheme (f, t) may assign an allocation of size
Optimal Symmetric Scheme under Strong Externalities
We assume that the network externalities are sufficiently large in the sense specified below.
14 An explicit formula for r K (y K ) is presented in the Appendix. 15 Note that (r n ) (y mn ) ≥ (r m ) (y mn ) holds only if y mn <z n .
Assumption 5
For any m < n and y
The following proposition verifies that Assumption 5 is a requirement on the degree of network externalities for the linear valuation functions. 
w(y) is the maximal revenue that the seller can raise from any single buyer i when he only takes in account (i) IC of buyer i, and (ii) ex post IR of all buyers. It hence gives an upper bound on the expected revenue under a symmetric, ex post implementable price-posting scheme (f, y). We can also make the following observation. Suppose that (f, y) is a regular scheme. Suppose further that s −i ∈ L K (y) for some i and
On the other hand, since the network size is maximized subject to IR, if
and the unconditional expected revenue from buyer i equals
If 
The following theorem proves the optimality of a regular scheme by showing that any maximizer y of w satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. Then the optimal symmetric price-posting scheme is regular.
When the externalities are positive but weak, preliminary analysis indicates that an optimal ex post implementable symmetric scheme is not regular. Full characterization of an optimal scheme in such an environment appears extremely difficult as it entails a very complex allocation rule. As seen in the next section, however, requiring a stronger version of incentive compatibility recovers the regularity of an optimal scheme for any positive degree of externalities.
Optimal Symmetric Scheme under Coalitional Implementability
Given a price-posting scheme (f, t), a subset J ⊂ I of buyers, and signal profiles s = (s J , s −J ) andŝ J ,ŝ J is a profitable deviation for the coalition J at s if
(f, t) is coalitionally strategy-proof if no coalition of buyers has a profitable deviation at any signal profile. Coalitional strategy-proofness is hence a strong robustness requirement since even if there exists a group of buyers who share the information about their private signals and jointly misreport them, the deviation is not profitable. (f, t) is coalitionally ex post implementable if it is coalitionally strategy-proof and ex post individually rational.
Proposition 4 A regular scheme (f, t) is coalitionally ex post implementable.
Given the marginal signals y = (y 1 , . . . , y I ), define
M (y) is the set of sizes of a network whose marginal value is smaller than the marginal value for some larger network. Also, let
be the set of network sizes that may be achieved under an allocation rule f . If (f, y) is a regular scheme, then K(f ) = N , and also M (y) = ∅ since a larger network is always more affordable ( 
R(f, y) ≤ w(K(f ), y).
If (f, y) is regular, then R(f, y) = w(N, y).
Given that the expected revenue from a regular scheme (f, y) equals an upper bound w (N, y) , it is optimal if the function w(K, y) is itself maximized at some (N, y) . The following theorem shows that this in fact holds. 
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Most of the sales schemes for network goods proposed in the literature specify a fixed price or transfer for each allocation but do not coordinate the buyers' adoption decisions. A price-posting scheme maintains a one-to-one correspondence between the price and allocation and allows the seller to coordinate the buyers' adoption decisions through the reported signals. As such, hence, it presents a reasonable generalization of many sales schemes studied in the literature. The ex post implementability eliminates the multiplicity of equilibria, a central issue in the network adoption problems. We identify the conditions under which the optimal scheme is regular. In a regular scheme, a more affordable price is set for a larger network, and given those prices, the network size is maximized as allowed by individual rationality. Given that regularity is defined in terms of the private signals, it has no direct implication on the actual price levels for different allocations. As observed in the example in Section 4.1, it is consistent with a lower price for a smaller network when the network externalities are strong, and a lower price for a larger network when the externalities are not so strong. The observation in the first case corresponds to a refund from the seller to the adopters when the number of adoptions is below some threshold.
In this paper, we have only looked at positive network externalities. It would be interesting to study optimal sales schemes under negative externalities as seen in the case of snob consumption, or more complex forms of externalities based on graph structure. 17 Network goods are often supplied competitively as in the case of cellular phones or PC operating systems. While some aspects of such competition have been analyzed by Shapiro (1985, 1986) , much remains to be understood.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
17 See Sundararajan (2007) for one such formulation.
and
It hence follows that
This further implies that
contradicting the strategy-proofness of (f, t).
Ex post IR requires that
v i (a 1 , 0) − t i (a 1 ) = −t i (a 1 ) ≥ 0.
For s i and s
Hence,
(Sufficiency) Fix i ∈ I and s −i ∈ S −i . Strategy-proofness:
where the inequality follows from (2). Ex post IR:
Proof of Theorem 1
We begin with the following lemma. 
Lemma 5 Suppose that (f, t) is an optimal ex post implementable price posting scheme against two buyers under Assumption 2. Then
There exist no
0 ≤ α 1 < β 1 ≤ 1 such that f (s) = 0 for every s ∈ (α 1 , β 1 ) × (y 01 2 , 1].
0 ≤ α 2 < β 2 ≤ 1 such that f (s) = 0 for every s ∈ (y 10 1 , 1] × (α 2 , β 2 ).
L 11 is a rectangle with a non-empty interior such that
(1, 1) ∈ L 11 and (0, 0) / ∈ L 11 .
Proof
Then (f ,t) is ex post implementable and raises a strictly positive expected revenue
Again, (f ,t) is ex post implementable and raises a strictly positive expected revenue
both cases, R(f,t) > R(f, t).
3. If L 11 = ∅, then it contains (1, 1) by Assumption 2 and Proposition 2. Suppose that int L 11 = ∅. The optimality of (f, t) would then imply that (1, 1) ∈ L 10 ∪ L 01 . Assume without loss of generality that (1, 1) ∈ L 10 . We will show that (f, t) is dominated by an alternative scheme (f ,t) defined as follows: This is strictly greater than the expected revenue under (f, t) from the same set since the latter is bounded above by . The reasoning similar to that of Case 3 above yields (A) and (B2).
Proof of Theorem 2
We first examine the optimality of configuration (B1), which requires y 10 1 < y 11 1 < y suggesting that (B1) cannot be optimal. The symmetric discussion shows that (B2) is also suboptimal. Consider next configuration (C1) which requires y 10 1 < y 11 1 < 1.
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The expected revenue can be written as: (10, y 11 1 ) < 0 by Assumption 3. Therefore, the derivative is strictly negative and (C1) cannot be optimal. That (C2) cannot be optimal is shown by a symmetric argument. We are then left with configurations in (A), which require either y 11 1 ≤ y b or y 11 2 ≤ y 01 2 . The expected revenue under each one of (A) has the same expression as that under (B2) in (5). It then follows from the discussion there that the optimal values satisfy y 10 1 =z 10 1 , y 01 2 =z 01 2 , y 11 1 ≤z 10 1 and y 11 2 ≤z 10 2 . The optimal scheme is hence (A0), which is regular.
Formula for r K (y K ): We can verify that the seller's expected revenue from these price offers equals
When y k kn < y kmkn for every < m and n, we can express r K (y K ) as
Proof of Lemma 4 (i) For m < n,
. This readily follows from Assumption 4(iv), which implies that
(ii) For each n ∈ I, r n is strictly log-concave with the (unique) maximizerz n which satisfies 1 >z 1 ≥ · · · ≥z I > 0.
Note that
Since g(s)
1−G(s) is strictly increasing and
r n (·) is strictly decreasing, implying that r n is strictly log-concave. Hence, the maximizerz n of r n is unique and satisfiesz n ∈ (0, 1) as
.
,
which contradicts (i).
(iii)
Since s < s , this holds if g(·)
1−G(·) is (strictly) increasing, and
. By the log-concavity of v m , the latter inequality holds if
, which is true by (i).
(iv) If m < n, s < s , s = ϕ mn (s, s ), and (r n ) (s ) ≥ (r m ) (s ), then r n (s ) > r mn (s, s ).
We first show that (r n ) (s) ≥ (r m ) (s) implies that (r n ) (s), (r m ) (s) ≥ 0. Note that (r n ) (s) ≥ (r m ) (s) is equivalent to
and that (r n ) (s) ≥ 0 is equivalent to
Furthermore, since
(8) then follows from (9) and (7). That (r m ) (s) > 0 can be obtained in a similar manner. Now, since (r n ) (s ), (r m ) (s ) ≥ 0, we have (r m ) (s) > 0 and (r n ) (s ) > 0 for any s, s < s by the strict log-concavity of r m and r n . It hence follows from (iii) that for any such s and s ,
Now fix s such that r n (s ) > r m (s ), and consider the following functions of
Both functions are differentiable over the domain, and the graph of the former lies above that of the latter since both of them go through (s , s ) and have a single crossing point because of (10), which shows that the latter has a steeper slope than the former at any point of intersection between the two. Hence, for any s < s , we have
In other words, whenever
and s < s . The desired conclusion then follows since by (6) ,
Proof of Proposition 3
Since the density g is continuous and strictly positive
Since r m (y m ) ≥ r n (y n ) and y m > y n imply v m (y m ) > v n (y n ), using the linearity of the value functions, we see that the above inequality holds if
into the above, we obtain
Since y n < ρ m ρ n < ε, the increasing hazard rate condition then implies that the above holds if
which is true for a small ε > 0. For Assumption 5.2, the assumed linearity of v n implies thatμ n = μ n = ρ n−1 ρ n < ε. The inequality then holds if
which is true for a small ε > 0.
Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of the theorem begins with Lemmas 6, 7 and 8. 
where
Proof.
Step 1.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists K such that K ⊂ I, |K| ≥ 2, and
If there exists more than one such set that satisfies (11) , choose any one with the smallest cardinality |K|. Write K = {κ 1 , . . . , κ n } for some 2 ≤ n ≤ I and κ 1 < · · · < κ n . Now consider y such that
Given that K has the smallest cardinality, z must satisfy (12): Otherwise, there is redundancy in K and we can find a strictly smaller setK ⊂ K such that rK(zK ) = r K (z K ). Write y κ 1 κ 2 , . . . , y κ n−1 κn as functions of y κ 1 , . . . , y κn as follows:
By our choice of K, we must have 0
Note that L J (z) = ∅ for any J ⊂ N such that K ⊂ J and κ n ∈ J: Suppose to the contrary that
we must have λ κn−1 < z κn , contradicting the assumption that κ n ∈ J. Hence,
This suggests thatŵ(y) ≤ w(y) for any y, andŵ(z) = w(z) by our hypothesis.
From the definition ofŵ, we have
we observe that the FOC ∂ŵ ∂y κn (z) = 0 is given by
Note that the bracketed term is negative and that
It follows that this equation holds only if
Recall from (6) that
The derivative of r K is hence given by
Since
Substituting this into (6), we obtain
This however contradicts our original supposition.
Step 2.
As an induction hypothesis, suppose that for m = μ + 1, . . . , I, there exists
We will show that r
for any K such that K ⊂ Π μ and |K| ≥ 2. Suppose to the contrary that r
As in Step 1, we observe that L J (z) = ∅ for any J such that κ n ∈ J and K ⊂ J. 18 Thenŵ(y) ≤ w(y) for any y andŵ(z) = w(z) by the induction hypothesis. Since
The reasoning is the same as that following the definition ofŵ in Step 1.
the third term in the definition ofŵ is independent of y Πμ . It follows that
Noting that
∂y κn (z), we conclude as before that
∂y κn (z K ) ≥ 0. Using the same logic as in Step 1, we can then derive the contradiction that r K (z K ) < r κn (z κn ). This advances the induction step and completes the proof.
Proof. Suppose not and take the largest n for which z πn = 0 or 1, where π 1 , . . . , π I are as defined in Lemma 6. It would then follow that r πn (z πn ) = 0 and hence that r π (z π ) = 0 for every < n as well. Defineẑ to be such that
We then have
where the inequality holds since r πn ( 
Proof. Note first that argmax y w(y) = ∅ since w is a continuous function over the compact domain [0, 1] I . Let z = (z 1 , . . . , z I ) ∈ argmax y w(y) be any maximizer. We prove the claim by induction over μ = 1, . . . , I.
Step 1. r I (z I ) = max ∅ =J⊂I r J (z J ). Given the conclusion of Lemma 6, the claim is equivalent to π I = I, where π 1 , . . . .π I are as defined there. Suppose to the contrary that π I < I, and take n < I such that π n = I. If we definê 
Since z ∈ (0, 1) I by Lemma 7, the FOC ∂ŵ ∂y πn (z) = 0 holds at y = z. Furthermore, since r πμ (z πμ ) ≤ r πn (z πn ) for every μ < n, and
the sum of the first and third terms on the right-hand side of (13) 
where 
Differentiating (16) with respect to y πn = y I and rearranging, we obtain
Now substitute (15) and (17) into (13) and set y = z to get ∂ŵ ∂y πn (z)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that the first term on the righthand side of (13) is positive (i.e., (14)), and the second from Assumption 1 along with the fact that z πn < z πm and r πm (z πm ) ≥ r πn (z πn ). We have hence derived a contradiction to the fact that z is an interior maximizer.
Step 2. For n = 1, . . . , I − 1, r n (z n ) = max ≤n r (z ).
As an induction hypothesis, suppose that the statement holds for n + 1, . . . , I. Defineŵ
We then haveŵ n (y) ≤ w(y) for any y, and by the induction hypothesis,ŵ n (z) = w(z). Hence, since z is a maximizer of w, it is a maximizer ofŵ n as well. Note that the second term on the right-hand side above is independent of (y 1 , . . . , y n ), and the first term has the same form asŵ in Step 1 with the only exception that n replacing I. This implies that the same reasoning as that in step 1 proves
We now return to the proof of the theorem. We will show that any maximizer z of w :
For any y such that y I > y I−1 , we have
Suppose now that there exists a maximizer z of w such that z I > z I−1 . Since z ∈ (0, 1) I by Lemma 7, z satisfies the FOC's:
As an induction hypothesis, suppose that z I ≤ · · · ≤ z n . Suppose that z n > z n−1 . For any y such that y I ≤ · · · ≤ y n and y n > y n−1 , we have
∂y n (y) = 0, and
where λ k I−n is the kth largest value among I − n signals. Hence,
The first-order condition ∂w ∂y n (z) = 0 then yields
On the other hand, suppose y n+1 ≤ y n−1 < y n . Other cases can be treated in a similar manner. 
This in turn implies that 
where the first inequality follows from (v k ) > (v m ) , and the second from y k ≤ y m . We will show thatŝ is a profitable deviation for I at s: For j ∈ J ∩ {j : f j (s) = 1},
For j ∈ J ∩ {j : f j (s) = 0},
For j ∈ I \ J, v j (f (ŝ), s j ) − t j (f (ŝ)) = 0 = v j (f (s), s j ) − t j (f (s)).
Since s i > y k , if f i (s) = 1, then (25) holds with strict inequality for j = i, and if f i (s) = 0, then (26) holds with strict inequality for j = i. Hence, (f, t) is not strategy-proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4
This implies thatŝ is not a profitable deviation for J at s. 
Proof of Theorem 4
(λ −1 − y ) < 0) r k (y k ) = P (max ∈K (λ −1 − y ) < 0) r 1 (y 1 ) + k∈K P (λ k−1 ≥ y k , max ∈K >k (λ −1 − y ) < 0) r k (y k )
≥ w(K, y).
If n > 1, then n − 1 ∈ K and letŷ be such that 
